Why I'm a "Seven"

I apologise in advance for my poor structure. I often just start type-blabbing. I just decided to put it up this time. Feel free to point out any errors you perceive in my thinking, or in the way I have conveyed it. 

Richard Dawkins' scale of theistic probability usually finds people who consider themselves atheist falling at or around a "six". That is, according to the wording, they weigh the probability of a god's existence just short of zero, don't claim to know for certain, but live their lives as if no god does exist. They don't know, and they don't believe.

A "one" on the scale is to be an absolute believer in a god or gods, whereas a "seven" is a person who claims to know absolutely that there is no god or gods.

The scale from Wikipedia:

1. Strong theist. 100 per cent probability of God. In the words of C.G. Jung: "I do not believe, I know."
2. De facto theist. Very high probability but short of 100 per cent. "I don't know for certain, but I strongly believe in God and live my life on the assumption that he is there."
3. Leaning towards theism. Higher than 50 per cent but not very high. "I am very uncertain, but I am inclined to believe in God."
4. Completely impartial. Exactly 50 per cent. "God's existence and non-existence are exactly equiprobable."
5. Leaning towards atheism. Lower than 50 per cent but not very low. "I do not know whether God exists but I'm inclined to be skeptical."
6. De facto atheist. Very low probability, but short of zero. "I don't know for certain but I think God is very improbable, and I live my life on the assumption that he is not there."
7. Strong atheist. "I know there is no God, with the same conviction as Jung knows there is one."

Agnosticism is often taken to mean, in an everyday sense, that one might be somewhere in the middle as to knowledge *or* belief concerning the existence of a god or gods. This turns out to be a less than sufficiently accurate definition, when concepts are analysed in greater detail. We find ourselves needing to distinguish between questions of knowledge and questions of belief. If you're already up on the non-mutual-exclusivity of the terms, gnosticism or agnosticism with theism or atheism, please do skip ahead, but most folks still look at these terms on a linear gradient, though they aren't.

Is the Dawkins Scale, therefore, one that deals with belief or knowledge? Does it try to include both?

Hard to say, as it seems to make the same mistake most often made when pondering this set of questions together. At the Theism end, the weight of belief is prevalent, while at the Atheism end knowledge comes to the forefront. I can't simply disregard one question or the other, so I'm forced to add an evaluation of the scale from a perspective which takes into account the non-mutual-exclusivity of the terms involved. 

Gnosticism and Agnosticism address whether it is, or is not, possible to know that a god or gods exist. Theism and Atheism deal with whether someone believes there is or is not a god or gods. They ask different questions, and thus, are not mutually exclusive. Here's a chart:

It's important to make these distinctions if we're to describe our positions honestly and accurately.

In terms of the paradigm, we can view Dawkins' scale from a different angle. 

1. Gnostic Theist

2. Agnostic Theist

3. Agnostic Theist

4. ...

Here we run into another problem. The scale references probabilities. Fifty percent knowledge is not sufficient to say we know something. That starts at 51%, as we judge such claims. Therefore, I'd have to conclude that this point falls into the realm of the Agnostic. Fifty percent belief is nonsensical. Either you believe something, or you don't. You may waffle between one state and the other, but the mere fact that this happens indicates uncertainty of belief, and therefore must fall under the category of Atheist, when such is defined as simply lacking a belief in a god. 

4. Agnostic Atheist

5. Agnostic Atheist

6. Agnostic Atheist

7. Gnostic Atheist

Now that that's out of the way, we can file it for later, and get to the issue which I see as the heart of this whole set of questions; a detail that needs to be addressed, and which leads me to the title conclusion. The issue of definitions. You can't really evaluate where you sit on the scale, if key definitions are not first nailed down. We throw the term "god" around as if it's either self-explanatory and obvious, or we've already worked out and agreed upon a standard definition. That bit is far from resolved. All we have is a varying set of claimed characteristics, so that is what we're forced to address.

Firstly, what do we mean by "existence"? Existence, as it is dependent on any example we have of things that exist, must be a subset of reality. To claim otherwise is to have no position whatsoever, as existence without reality is nonsensical. 

Reality is the sum of observable and independently, objectively verifiable subsets. The minute someone says outside space-time, or some such nonsense, he's already jumped ship. The terms are not compatible with reality. More precisely, our words and their definitions are dependent on the functionality of our observable world. If someone starts making claims about existence outside of existence, the functionality of the claim breaks down with the definitions of the terms used. 

So, the same goes for attributes claimed for a god. If your god is indefinable, then well, you don't have anywhere to start  substantiating any claim for it. If you have a set of traits that you wish to proffer for your god, then you must demonstrate each of those traits as logical and rational with respect to each other and reality. This, of course, will not even begin to show that any god exists. It would be backward to describe traits for something the existence of which one hasn't yet substantiated. However, this line of reasoning goes to show why I conclude the opposite to be true, when the definition of any particular god is dependent on the attributes claimed for it. 

Secondly, what do we mean by "know"? Sounds pseudo-profound, I get it, but it's an important question when contemplating this issue, as it's often abused by religious claimants. 

To know something is to be able to show objective evidence for the truth value of a claim. Its incorporation in reality is repeatably demonstrable and independently verifiable. We cannot know something unless we can show that we know it, incontrovertibly .. or at least functionally, with regard to overarching reality.

Thirdly, what do we mean by "believe"? This is a common point of equivocation by religious claimants seeking to assert rationality for their mindset. There are two functional definitions of believe. One is used to denote trust in something or someone based on prior fidelity and confirmed or confirmable evidence. It's a matter of conditional trust. The other carries the religious sense, that something is taken to be true without, or contrary to established fact. This is the position claimed for the concept of "faith", where in the face of the lack of evidence to use the first definition, the religious conjure a virtue from the gullibility of believing without any demonstrable evidence. I'm sure they'd disagree.

Most importantly, what do we mean by "god"? Everyone seems to come up with their own definition, when pressed to. Most try to refer to a prepackaged concept, set up by the traditions of their particular religion, hoping they can escape the hook of actually not knowing the details of what they profess to believe. 

We can go back to creation stories, cite traditions, parables, legends and myths. We can talk about the vast unknowns of the universe, and ponder our relation to and in it. We can examine our feelings and needs in relation to our desires. But, none of this tells us what a god is, or is supposed to be. It always boils its way back down to a dependence on a set of characteristics and attributes claimed for a god. So, what are they? Claimants have the problem of knowing (perhaps only subconsciously), that something real must have attributes that are describable, observable and testable; without having anything tangible to describe. Faced with this, they take the superlative of any positive trait they can conceive of, to try and fill in the absent features of their preferred deity. They do so failing to also realise that the resulting set is logically incompatible with existence as we define it. 

Supernatural, perfect, infinite, omniscient, omnipotent, omni-benevolent, omnipresent, unchanging, timeless, spaceless, vengeful, jealous, loving, personal, etc.

If we take all, or even a subset, of characteristics claimed for a god, or God, (the term co-opted by the Abrahamic religions as a personal name), then we're left with a menagerie of logically contradictory elements.

If something shows logical contradiction, then either the thing as defined does not exist, or the thing exists not as defined. More probably the former, when no examples of a thing are available. This usually wouldn't be a problem, but with the definition of a god, none of the claimed characteristics is sacrificeable, without defining the being in question out of godhood. Additionally, special exemption can be claimed for any imaginary or non-existent thing. Is your god then imperfect? No? dependent on time? No? of limited knowledge? No?

For actual rundowns on the logical contradictions of claimed traits for a god, history and the internet are full of them.

Finally, what does it mean to be "certain"? It can only mean that one "knows" to the point of functionality. It doesn't mean that all knowledge of a subject is static and fulfilled. 

Getting back to belief and knowledge- It is only rational to believe that for which there is demonstrable objective evidence. Doing otherwise is irrational by definition. 

Given that, on the question of belief, I can safely say I have none for the existence of any god or gods, based on the fact that there is no demonstrable objective evidence for one.

On the question of knowledge, which is the hotpoint, I must consider all these definitions as I've detailed them. 

The bottom line is, by all current definitions of god and gods, the logical incongruity of its attributes leaves a conclusion for a functionally knowable non-existence. 

Pointing to my use of current definitions as a qualifier, as if to somehow hint at broader possibilities, is a non-issue. We function under the definitions of concepts as they are, not as they might be. Some concepts may expand and be more precisely defined with further information, but there are certain undeniable logical truths that don't change. 2+2=4. We know this, and it will not change. There's no such thing as a square circle. Invisible pink, etc. Simply put, the characteristics claimed for a "god" make it logically impossible, and therefore, I can claim to know that it doesn't exist, by our definitions of "exist" and "god". 

If you want to move the goal posts and talk about things that are undefined and unknowable, where do we get with that? Nowhere.